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COMMENTS
IN RE GAULT: UNDERSTANDING THE ATTORNEY'S
NEW ROLE
There is no probability, in the proper administration of the law,
of the child's liberty being unduly invaded. Every statute which
is designed to give protection, care, and training to children, as
a needed substitute for parental authority and performance of
parental duty, is but a recognition of the duty of the state, as the
legitimate guardian and protector of children where other guard-
ianship fails. No constitutional right is violated, but one of the
most important duties which organized society owes to its help-
less members is performed ...
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 56-57, 62 Atl. 198,
201 (1905).
While there can be no doubt of the original laudible purpose of
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise serious
questions as to whether actual performance measures well enough
against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity of
the process from the reach of constitutional guaranties applicable
to adults. . . . There is evidence, in fact, that there may be
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
for children.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1966).
I. INTRODUCTION
The above quotations illustrate the great changes in critical evaluation
that have occurred in the nearly seven decades since the inauguration of
the juvenile court as an instrumentality of individualized justice. The
concern expressed by Mr. Justice Fortas in the Kent case,' regarding the
lack of constitutional protection for juveniles, has now become an indict-
ment of the juvenile court system in the United States. Because of the
treatment afforded a fifteen year old boy in Gila County, Arizona, Mr.
Justice Fortas, in speaking of the lack of procedural safeguards main-
tained in the juvenile courts, stated that, "juvenile court history has again
demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated,
is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure."'2
1. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
2. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
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On June 8, 1964, Gerald Francis Gault and Ronald Lewis were taken
into custody. Gerald was then subject to a six months probation order
as a result of his having been in the company of another boy who had
stolen a wallet from a woman's purse. The action taken by the police
on June 8 was the result of a verbal complaint by a neighbor of the boys,
in regard to a telephone call made to her in which the caller or callers
made lewd or indecent remarks. No notice was given to Gerald's parents
when he was taken into custody, however, when Mrs. Gault went to the
detention home that night she was orally informed of the reason for her
son's detention and that there would be a hearing the next afternoon. At
this hearing, Gerald and his parents were not advised of their right to
counsel. The juvenile court judge found Gerald delinquent under the
Arizona statute which defines a "delinquent child" as "one who is habitually
involved in immoral matters,"3 or "who habitually so deports himself as to
injure or endanger the morals or health of himself or others."'4 The judge
based his findings on Gerald's admission of guilt at the adjudicative and
dispositional hearings, and committed him to the state industrial school
for the period of his minority, that is, until he reached the age of twenty-
one. Gerald's parents filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Arizona
Supreme Court who referred it to the superior court for hearing. The writ
was dismissed and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal
notwithstanding various arguments attacking the constitutionality of the
Arizona Juvenile Code because of alleged denial of procedural due process
to juveniles charged with delinquency. 5
Appeal was taken to the United States Supreme Court,6 petitioners
alleging that the rights of notice of the charges, right to counsel, right to
confrontation and cross-examination, the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, the right to a transcript of the proceedings, and the right to appellate
review were denied contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment requires that juveniles, in a proceeding
to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution
in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, must be given sufficient notice
to permit preparation of a defense to the charges; that the juvenile and
the parents be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel
retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will
be appointed to represent the child; that he be advised of his right to
remain silent; and that absent a valid confession adequate to support the
determination of the juvenile court, he be guaranteed the right of con-
frontation and cross-examination. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. ARIZ. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201-6(d) (1956).
4. ARIZ. Rtv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201-6(a) (1956).
5. Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965).
6. Appeal taken under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1952).
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II. Parens PatriaC AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
The parens patriae rationale which is the theoretical underpinning
for rejection of the adversary system in the juvenile courts, was expressed
by Chief Justice Stern of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Holmes'
Appeal:7
The proceedings in such a court are not in the nature of a criminal
trial but constitute merely a civil inquiry or action looking to the
treatment, reformation and rehabilitation of the minor child. Their
purpose is not penal but protective, - aimed to check juvenile delin-
quency and to throw around a child, just starting, perhaps, on an
evil course and deprived of proper parental care, the strong arm of
the State acting as parens patriae. The State is not seeking to punish
an offender but to salvage a boy who may be in danger of becoming
one, and to safeguard his adolescent life. Even though the child's
delinquency may result from the commission of a criminal act the
State extends to such a child the same care and training as to one
merely neglected, destitute or physically handicapped. No suggestion
or taint of criminality attaches to any finding of delinquency by a
Juvenile Court.
During the past decade a number of state and federal courts have
reasoned that the child is afforded protection from procedural abuse in
the juvenile process by the "fundamental fairness" concept of due process.8
However, the recent deluge of criticism by jurists, attorneys, and sociolo-
gists that has been directed at the ineffectiveness of this vague protective
concept expresses the general dissatisfaction with the operation of the
juvenile courts and their related organizations. 9 In fact, the caveat issued
by Mr. Justice Fortas in Kent v. United States ° that "the admonition
to function in a 'parental' relationship is not an invitation to procedural
arbitrariness," may prove to be the deathknell for the parens patriae
approach in the juvenile courts. As a requirement of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, a juvenile now must be afforded "fair treat-
7. 379 Pa. 599, 603-04, 109 A.2d 523, 525 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973(1955). For an early expression of the philosophy and goals of the juvenile court,
see Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104 (1910). Statements of the
philosophy of the juvenile court movement are collected in GLUECK, T114 PROBLEM
op DELINQUENCY ch. 11 (1959).
8. E.g., Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961) ; United States
v. Dickerson, 271 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ; Shioutakon v. District of Columbia,
236 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. 1956). For a sampling of state decisions see In re Gault,
supra note 2, at 12 n.8.
9. See Gardner, The Kent Case and the Juvenile Court: A Challenge to
Lawyers, 52 A.B.A.J. 923 (1966) ; Handler, The Juvenile Court And The Adversary
System: Problems Of Function And Form, 1965 Wis. L. Rtv. 7; Note, Rights and
Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. Rev. 281 (1967) ; Comment,
Criminal Offenders In The Juvenile Court: More Brickbats And Another Proposal,
114 U. PA. L. Rev. 1171 (1966); Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State
Courts, And Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775 (1966).
10. 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966). The decision in Kent, as to the validity of waiver
of jurisdiction in the juvenile court and the right to counsel at a hearing to determine
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ment" in connection with a court adjudication of delinquency." It should
be noted that this holding is merely the logical extension of Kent and a
reiteration of past federal and state decisions. 12 What the court considers
"fair treatment" in Gault, however, cannot be reconciled with what state
courts have deemed "fair treatment" to be in the past. The problem, of
course, is to ascertain the precise requirements that the due process clause
will now impose upon juvenile proceedings.13
Under prior case law, two mutually exclusive views were adhered to
in defining the procedural rights of juveniles. By far, the overwhelming
number of decisions support the conclusion that juvenile proceedings are
civil rather than penal in nature, and therefore, constitutional safeguards
are insured by application of the requirement of "fair treatment," "and
not by the direct application of the clauses of the Constitution which in
terms apply to criminal cases."' 14 However, these cases define what is not,
rather than what is included in the "fair treatment" concept. By applying
the "noncriminal" rubric to juvenile proceedings, the rights of counsel,
confrontation, bail, grand jury, public trial, and self-incrimination have
been excluded from the concept. 15 As the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit remarked, "These strict safeguards, however, are
wholly inappropriate for the flexible and informal procedures of the Juvenile
Court which are essential to its parens patriae function." 16
A diametrically opposed view was taken by the District Court for
the District of Columbia in In re PofJJ7 where it was reasoned that the
only possible purpose for the Juvenile Court Act in the District of Columbia
was to afford juveniles safeguards in addition to those they possessed
before the Juvenile Court Acts were passed.' 8 However, the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Pee v. United States,19
in effect limited the Poff decision when it noted that the cases cited by
appellants established that in certain circumstances the child is entitled
to due process, "however, what constitutes due process depends on the
circumstances of each individual case."' 20 Though limited by the circuit
court, the essence of the Poff decision has not gone unnoticed. The District
Court of Montana, in United States v. Morales,21 held that the require-
ments of due process and fundamental fairness "compel the same safe-
11. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1967). See Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.49 (1962) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1947).
12. See cases cited supra note 8.
13. Before passage of the juvenile court acts, minors accused of crime were en-titled to all of the constitutional safeguards possessed by adults exposed to criminalprosecutions. See State v. Ray, 63 N.H. 406 (1885); Commonwealth v. Horregan,
127 Mass. 450 (1879) ; People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 111. 280 (1870).14. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1959). The appendix to
the Pee opinion lists similar holdings in 51 jurisdictions. Id. at 561.
15. Id. at 563.
16. Harling v. United States, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
17. 135 F. Supp. 224 (D.D.C. 1955).
18. Supra note 13.
19. 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
20. Id. at 563.
21. 233 F. Supp. 160 (D. Mont. 1964).
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guards for a juvenile as for an adult charged with the same offense. 22
The court noted that a different result might be obtained where a case is
disposed of on a "social rather than legal basis," 23 but where the proceed-
ing is directed toward depriving the child of his liberty, constitutional
safeguards apply.24 Finally, a recent decision of the New York Court of
Appeals, dealing with the voluntariness of statements taken while the
juvenile was in custody, ignored the civil label which had been attached
to juvenile proceedings and attacked the substance of the proceeding as
"at the very least quasi-criminal in nature. ' 25 As in Morales, the New
York court asserted that the possible deprivation of personal liberty in-
cident to an adjudication of delinquency compels greater protection. 26
The history of the application of due process concepts to juvenile
rights has, at the least, been uncertain.27 Although In re Gault will help
to establish needed guidelines in this area, the immediate effect seems to
be that of elevating this uncertainty to a national level. The arguments
resounding in the Supreme Court today closely resemble those of Pee,2
Morales,29 and In re W.30 Mr. Justice Black, concurring in the instant
case, argues that when a person can be charged, convicted and sentenced
to be confined for six years for violating a state criminal law, regardless
of its being in a juvenile proceeding, "the Constitution requires that he be
tried in accordance with all the guarantees of all the Bill of Rights made
applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment."''1  His argument
is not based on concepts of "fair treatment" but is grounded solely on the
rights conferred by the fifth and sixth amendments.32 Mr. Justice Harlan,
however, rests his concurrence and dissent on the due process clause
alone.33 He suggests three criteria by which the procedural requirements
of due process can be measured in the juvenile courts. First, no more
restrictions should be imposed than are necessary to assure the funda-
mental fairness of the proceedings. Secondly, the restrictions which are
imposed should be those which preserve the essential elements of the state's
purpose. And finally, restrictions should be chosen which will later permit
the orderly selection of any additional protections which may prove
necessary. 34 Applying these criteria, Mr. Justice Harlan would not apply
22. Id. at 165.
23. Ibid.
24. Contra, Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 973 (1955).
25. In re W., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 62, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 680, 224 N.E.2d 102, 106 (1966).
26. Ibid. See Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 614, 109 A.2d 523, 530 (1954) (Muss-
mano, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
27. See generally Comment, 40 WASH. L. Rev. 189 (1965).
28. Supra note 14.
29. Supra note 21.
30. Supra note 25.
31. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 61.
32. Ibid. Cf. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 412 (1965) (concurring opinion)
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
33. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 66.
34. Id. at 72.
SUMMER 1967] COMMENTS
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the privilege against self-incrimination in what he believes to be a non-
criminal proceeding.85
Somewhere between these views rest Mr. Justice Fortas' majority
opinion and the future characteristics of this country's juvenile courts.
The aspect of the majority opinion which must be considered initially is
that the juvenile proceeding has not been labeled criminal. While the
opinion expressly states that "juvenile proceedings to determine 'delin-
quency,' which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be
regarded as 'criminal' for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion,"'3 6 the conclusion that, as far as all other procedural safeguards are
concerned, the juvenile proceeding is to be considered civil in nature,
should be avoided. A more realistic approach would seem to be a recog-
nition of the distaste expressed for a categorical labeling of the juvenile
proceeding as either totally criminal or civil.
The cogency of this approach is evident when it is recalled that the
Court made use of both the "fair treatment" aspect of the due process
clause and the strict application of the fifth amendment. The right to
counsel and adequate notice are mandated by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment, whereas the fourteenth amendment's only
role in regard to the privilege against self-incrimination is that it makes
the fifth amendment applicable to the states and thus, applicable to
juvenile proceedings.
The Court's refusal to affirm the parens patriae rationale stems from
the abuse of this concept in denying juveniles fundamental due process
rights, 7 particularly its use in justifying the extended detention of
juveniles. 8 Confinement for the purpose of treatment in an institution
must be regarded as a deprivation of liberty, regardless of the label attached
to the institution. In fact, Mr. Justice Fortas saw fit to note39 Pennsylvania
Supreme Court Justice Mussmano's dissent in Holmes' Appeal,40 which
pointed out the penal nature of juvenile proceedings in Pennsylvania and
which scoffed at the euphemistic labeling of a bleak, lonely reformatory
as an "industrial school." The Court, in the instant case, went as far as
to infer that the continuance of the original change in procedure - the
handling of juveniles in civil proceedings rather than in adult criminal
courts, as they were during the nineteenth century - must be based both
upon a change in theory and the substantial realization of that theory in
practice. 41 That is, a civil commitment for special treatment must provide
that special treatment if the statute is to be sustained. 42
35. Id. at 74-76.
36. Id. at 49. (Emphasis added.) The right to adequate notice and counsel
were grounded solely on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 31 and 34.
37. Id. at 21-24.
38. Id. at 29.
39. Ibid.
40. 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 973 (1955).41. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 22 n.30. See Paulsen, Fairness To The Juvenile
Offender, 41 MINN. L. Rtv. 547 (1957).
42. See Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); Director of Patuxent
Institution v. Daniels, ___ Md. _, 221 A.2d 397 (1966). The character of juvenile
[VOL. 12
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Reading Gault narrowly, a definition of due process as it relates to
juveniles would include: the right to adequate notice, the right to be
advised of the assistance of counsel (including court appointment), the
right to remain silent at the hearing, and finally, absent a valid confession,
the right to confrontation and cross-examination. This much of the ad-
versary process has invaded the realm of the parens patriae approach to
juvenile court proceedings. The Court makes it quite clear, however, that
the opinion does not apply to the pre-judicial stages or dispositional proc-
esses of the juvenile courts, 48 and infers that the considerations brought
to bear on the adjudicatory stage may not be applicable to the other stages
of the juvenile process. 44 The Court points out that the observance of due
process standards "will not compel the States to abandon or displace any
of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process, ' '45 nor does the hearing
have to "conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial. .... -46
Nevertheless, the Court mentions only two procedures which are to be
necessarily retained from past operations of the juvenile courts, the proc-
essing and treatment of juveniles separately from adults and the classifica-
tion of juvenile offenders as delinquent rather than criminal.47 In the
context of these considerations, the ensuing discussion will examine the
specific effects Gault will have on the various stages of the juvenile
process, for Gault can justifiably be viewed as the germinal seed of a
movement from the parens patriae approach to an adversary process in
the juvenile courts.
III. NOTICE AND DEFINITION
The Supreme Court has emphasized that in order for the proceeding
in question to comply with due process, adequate and timely notice of the
alleged misconduct must be given to the child and his parents. 48 Not only
is notice a fundamental of due process, but it is an essential element in
an effective adversary system. 49 The type of notice mandated by a court
necessarily sets the tone for the adjudicative hearing to follow. Notice
of a general allegation of delinquency, if deemed adequate, would not
effectively afford parents and counsel a reasonable opportunity to prepare,
thus leaving the processes of presenting the facts, adjudicating delinquency,
institutions has been subjected to serious attack, indicating that this special treatment
has not been given in these institutions. See Handler, The Juvenile Court And The
Adversary System: Problems Of Function And Form, 1965 Wis. L. RZv. 7, 12-13.
43. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 13.
44. Id. at 31 n.48.
45. Id. at 22-23.
46. Id. at 30. There has been little questioning of the decision to handlejuveniles in a separate legal process or to try them for delinquency. See Handler,
supra note 42, at 7.
47. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 22, 23. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 261 (1964).
48. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 73 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part) citing Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413, 424 (1915);
Roller v. Holly, 176 U.S. 398, 409 (1900).




Equi et al.: In Re Gault: Understanding the Attorney's New Role
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
and arriving at a disposition solely in the hands of the court. Particularized
notice would tend to shift at least some part of the fact finding process to
the accused, thereby introducing the adversary system into juvenile courts.
The Indiana Court of Appeals has held that a child brought before a
juvenile court is entitled to a clear statement of the nature of the pro-
ceedings against him so that he can prepare his defense.50 However,
some states have interpreted the juvenile court acts as not requiring the
same degree of particularity in the informations as is provided for adults.5
In the instant case, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected appellant's claim
that he was denied due process by the inadequate notice that had been
given, by stating, inter alia, that it was "the policy of the juvenile law
to hide youthful errors from the full gaze of the public and bury them
in the graveyard of the forgotten past.' '5 2 Thus advance notice of the
specific charges or grounds for taking the juvenile into custody and for
the hearing is not necessary.5 3  In the classic Pennsylvania decision,
Holmes' Appeal, Chief Justice Stern noted that it has been held to be
an abuse of discretion for a juvenile court to begin a hearing on the
merits without providing notice to the parents or persons having custody
of the child.5 4 However, he considered such notice unnecessary where
the parents portrayed a total lack of interest, were indifferent towards
the child, or were unable to control him. 5
These interpretations have seemingly been put to rest by Gault. Citing
both criminal and civil decisions which define adequate notice require-
ments under the due process clause,5 6 the Court couched its decision in
classic criminal terms, holding that, "notice, to comply with due process
requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance of scheduled court
proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to prepare will be afforded,
and it must set forth the alleged misconduct with particularity. '5 7 The
Court requires that notice be given to the child as well as to the parents 8
thereby overruling cases and practices which have considered notice to the
child unnecessary. 9 As one commentator has pointed out, "If anything,
the immature minor should be informed of these purported wrongs with
greater particularity so that no magnified fears be engendered in the mind
50. In re Green, 125 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952). See TAPPAN, JUVENILP
DELINQUENCy 215 (1949).
51. E.g., Rose v. State, 137 Tex. Crim. 316, 129 S.W.2d 639 (1939) ; State
c.r rel. Roberts v. Johnson, 196 Iowa 300, 194 N.W. 202 (1923).
52. The court also stated that Mrs. Gault knew the exact nature of the charge
on the day Gerald was taken to the detention home, and that the Gaults appeared at
the two hearings without objection. Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 190, 407 P.2d
760, 767 (1965).
53. Id. at 190, 407 P.2d at 767.
54. Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 609, 109 A.2d 523, 527 (1954), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 973 (1955), citing Rose Child Dependency Case, 161 Pa. Super. 204, 207-08,
54 A.2d 297, 298 (1947).
55. Id. at 609, 109 A.2d at 527. Cf. Mill v. Brown, 31 Utah 473, 88 Pac.
609 (1907).
56. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 33 n.53.
57. Id. at 33.
58. Ibid.
59. See Note, 67 COLUM. L. Rpv. 281, 328 (1967).
[VOL. 12
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of the child."" ° The creation of this fear, coupled with the fact that
parents often are indifferent to the problems of their children, demonstrates
the need for dual notice.
One of the purposes of mandating adequate notice is to clarify the
issues that are to be adjudicated at the juvenile court hearing,6 thereby
allowing counsel sufficient time to prepare a defense to these charges.
The implication that follows from the requirement of such notice is that
the juvenile will be tried for specific acts. However, the juvenile court
statutes define delinquency in terms of a continuous mode of conduct as
well as specific antisocial acts. For example, the Pennsylvania Juvenile
Court Act defines a delinquent as a child who has violated any state or
municipal law or ordinance, has been habitually disobedient so as to be
uncontrollable by his parents or other legal custodian, has been habitually
truant from school or home, or has habitually behaved in a way injurious
to the morals or health of himself or others. 62 Arizona's statute, as noted
before, makes provision for children who are habitually involved in
immoral matters,63 and Iowa concludes the definitional section with the
catchall, a child "living under such other unfit surroundings as to bring
such child, in the opinion of the court, within the spirit of this chapter." 64
The language used in such delinquency statutes is so broad that it has
prompted commentators to remark that the language would be unconsti-
tutionally vague if used as the basis for a criminal prosecution,6 5 and
that it would be hard to imagine most active adolescents not capable of
falling within some part of the definition.60 Indeed, one irate writer stated:
In my opinion this is not a piece of legislation; it is a harangue. It
lacks the cold logic and precision of the law and it is full of moral
overtones, perhaps because it was meant to represent principles of
social reform rather than the embodiment of criminal jurisprudence.67
To alleviate the problems engendered by these broad statutes as well
as the stigma attached to a juvenile who is labeled a delinquent, some
states have separated those noncriminal actions - neglect, truancy, and
incorrigible cases - and placed them in a new category, thereby avoiding
the delinquent label. 68 But, this is not the general rule. Most have not,
and references to "incorrigibility," "run-away," "uncontrollable," and
"involved in immoral matters," remain in the definitions of delinquency. 69
60. Antieau, supra note 49, at 410.
61. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 34 n.54.
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243(4) (a)-(d) (1964).
63. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 201-6(d) (1956).
64. IOWA CODE § 232.2(7) (1946).
65. Paulsen, Fairness To The Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. Rev. 547, 556 (1957).
66. Handler, supra note 42, at 14.
67. Grygier, The Concept of The "State of Delinquency" And Its Consequences
For Treatment of Young Offenders, 11 WAYNS L. Rev. 627, 639 (1965).
68. See, e.g., CAL. WPLFARE AND INST'NS CODE §§ 600-02 (1966).
69. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. Rev. § 17-53 (1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11,
§ 243 (1964). See generally Glueck, Some "Unfinished Business" in the Management
of Juvenile Delinquency, 15 SYRACUSS L. Rlv. 628, 640-48 (1964).
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In these states, the broad standards are defended on the basis of parens
patriae-type reasoning - official intervention is thought necessary to
restrain and help an adolescent who is capable of harmful action.70 The
Gault decision does not appear to affect the future validity of these defini-
tions. However, while the statute has been deemed not to be penal, thus
rendering the void-for-vagueness doctrine inapplicable, 71 the Court, in the
instant case, has for the purposes of the fifth amendment, applied the
criminal label to juvenile proceedings.7 2 Therefore, it is not unrealistic
to suppose that the court may employ this same rationale in future con-
siderations of these definitions, thus reviving the possibility of the applica-
tion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. As the definitions now stand,
they are not "sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. .... 73
IV. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The parens patriae philosophy which gave birth to the juvenile court
movement at the beginning of the century, emphasizing treatment and reha-
bilitation, is reflected today in the informality of juvenile court proceedings.
The juvenile court hearing, to be really meaningful, must be much
more than a formal or perfunctory adjudication of the case. Its
conduct should reflect the principles that originally prompted the
establishment of juvenile courts. It should, therefore, be free from
the legalistic and often antiquated forms and technicalities which are
the attributes of criminal trials of adult offenders. 74
The proceeding is often characterized as an integral part of the
therapy,7 5 and in order to alleviate any association of the juvenile with
criminality, formality is avoided wherever possible, 76 and the informality
of these proceedings has generally been afforded constitutional sanction
by appellate courts on the ground that juvenile courts are noncriminal in
nature.7 7 Similarly, the employment of counsel in these proceedings is
thought to be unnecessary, 78 and courts have refused to reverse decisions
70. Handler, supra note 42, at 15.
71. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). See Note, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 67 (1961).
72. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 49.
73. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Accord, Com-
monwealth v. Randall, 183 Pa. Super. 603, 133 A.2d 276 (1957). For a discussion of
applying the void-for-vagueness doctrine to another statute providing for a civil
committment, see Comment, 12 VILL. L. Rev. 545, 553-62 (1967).
74. T ETERS & REINEMANN, THX CHALLENGE or DELINQUENcY 321 (1961).
75. See Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1176 (1966).
76. See Handler, The Juvenile Court And The Adversary System: Problems
Of Function And Form, 1965 Wis. L. Rxv. 7, 10; Rappeport, Determination of
Delinquency in the Juvenile Court: A Suggested Approach, 1958 WASIH. U.L.Q. 123,
161-62.
77. See, e.g., Cope v. Cambell, 175 Ohio St. 475, 196 N.E.2d 457 (1964) ; Holmes'
Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
78. TEETERS & REINEMANN, supra note 74, at 326.
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which have been appealed on the basis of failure to appoint, or notify of
the right to, counsel. 79
The Court, in the instant case, noted that there has been a developing
trend, both by statute and case law, to recognize the juvenile offender's
right to counsel.80 Some state statutes require the court to appoint counsel
for children in need,8 ' but, the burden of requesting counsel may be on
the accused juvenile.8 2 Other states, like Pennsylvania, make no provision
for the right to, or appointment of, counsel. As evidence of the former,
the Court cited recent District of Columbia cases which interpreted its
juvenile court act to mean that advice of the right to counsel, and the
right to have counsel appointed, must be given.8 By and large, the statutes
and decisions evidence a conflict in this area, some courts not informing
of the right, if present at all, others advising freely, and still others only
advising in serious cases.
8 4
In the instant decision, Mr. Justice Fortas first attacked the presump-
tion of the parens patriae rationale that the juvenile benefits from informal
proceedings in the juvenile court hearing by stating:
But recent studies have, with surprising unanimity, entered sharp
dissent as to the validity of this gentle conception [the juvenile court
judge as the fatherly protector of the young offender]. They suggest
that the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness, impartiality and
orderliness - in short, the essentials of due process may be a more
impressive and more therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile
is concerned.85
Noting the recent findings of sociologists Wheeler and Cottrell, the Court
observed that when stern discipline follows the procedural laxness of the
parens patriae attitude, the contrast may have an adverse effect upon the
juvenile who may feel that he has been deceived or enticed.86 Wheeler
and Cottrell conclude, "Unless appropriate due process of law is followed,
even the juvenile who has violated the law may not feel that he is being
fairly treated and may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court
personnel. 87 Acknowledging the similarity between the consequences of
being adjudged a delinquent (six year sentence) and a criminal, the Court
reasoned that the juvenile "needs the assistance of counsel to cope with
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
79. E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Walls v. Rundle, 414 Pa. 53, 198 A.2d 528(1964) ; People ex rel. Weber v. Fifield, 136 Cal. App. 2d 741, 289 P.2d 303 (1955).
80. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 37, 38.
81. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2) (Supp. 1966); N.Y. FAMILY CT.
AcT §§ 241, 249; ORE. Rxv. STAT. § 419.498(2) (1965). The California statute pro-
vides for mandatory appointment of counsel only where the offense would be a felony
under the criminal law. CAL. WELFARE AND INST'NS CODE § 634 (1966).
82. E.g., IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 16-1631 (Supp. 1965).
83. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 35 n.55.
84. See Note, 79 HARV. L. Rev. 775, 797 (1966).
85. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 26.
86. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 26 & n.37.
87. Id. at 26, quoting WIIELER & COTTRXLL, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY - ITS
PRIVgNTION AND CONTROL 33 (1966).
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regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense
and to prepare and submit it,"88 no less than the adult offender.89 It is
significant that, in requiring that the parent and child be advised of the
child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them (or appointed
if they are not able) in proceedings to determine delinquency, the Court
has implanted the heart of the adversary system in the juvenile courts.
Aside from formalizing the hearings, it is thought that the introduc-
tion of the adversary system will precipitate additional problems. A survey
of juvenile court judges expressed the feeling that most attorneys are not
at their best when involved with the juvenile process,90 it being primarily
felt that he lacks the necessary understanding of the juvenile court phi-
losophy; that is, trained: as an adversary, he is not trained to "treat" or
to compliment the socially oriented ramifications of the court action. He
is lacking in special skills and training beyond normal defense counsel
skills.91 He may fail to disassociate the interests of the child from the
parent, especially when he is retained by the parents,9 2 notwithstanding
the fact that in many instances the delinquency itself stems from neglectful
and inadequate parents.93 In response to a survey of Pennsylvania's
juvenile court judges conducted in conjunction with this note, all of the
judges responding (pre-Gault) felt that the attorney did have some role
in present juvenile court proceedings, however, only a small percentage
depicted him in his traditional adversarial role. The majority of judges
viewed him as an aid in presenting all the facts to the court.94
The Supreme Court seems to imply a middle ground position as to
the exact role counsel will take in the juvenile courts. The Court notes
that the section of the National Crime Commission's report pertinent to
this problem states:
Fears have been expressed that lawyers would make juvenile court
proceedings adversary. No doubt this is partly true, but it is partly
desirable. Informality is often abused. The juvenile courts deal with
cases in which facts are disputed and in which, therefore, rules of
evidence, confrontation of witnesses, and other adversary procedures
are called for.9 5
At the same time, the Court has indicated that the hearing need not con-
form with all of the requirements of a criminal trial,96 nor will the "con-
88. In rc Gault, supra note 2, at 36, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,
69 (1932), the Court stated, "the child 'requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him.' "
89. See Comment, 114 U. PA. L. Rpv. 1171, 1189 (1966).
90. Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation in Juvenile Court, A Survey of
Juvcnile Court Judges Serving the Nations Largest Metropolitan Areas, 4 J. FAMILY
LAW 77 (1964).
91. Id. at 93-94. See Furlong, The Juvenile Court and the Lawyer, 3 J. FAMILY
LAW 1, 4-5 (1963).
92. Skoler & Tenney, supra note 90, at 90-91.
93. See T tTFRS & RINVMANN, THe CHALLENG8 OF DZLINQUENcY 299-304 (1961).
94. See Appendix.
95. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 38 n.65. One court has indicated the need for
counsel even where the alleged delinquency falls short of criminality. See Jones v.
Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 341-42, 38 S.E.2d 444, 447 (1946).
96. Id. at 30.
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ception of the kindly juvenile judge" be replaced, even though some
elements of the adversary system will be introduced in contested cases.
97
Perhaps the best solution to the problem of the role of the attorney
is voiced in the New York Family Court Act, to which the Court makes
repeated reference. The "law guardian" concept of the Family Court Act
indicates a different concept of proper legal representation.98 The attorney
is portrayed not only as an advocate, but as a guardian and an officer of
the court.99 As an advocate, he is responsible for the protection of the
juvenile's constitutional rights; however, one writer notes, this does not
include "purposeless obstructionism."100 Another commentator points out
that there is little evidence that counsel become overzealous in asserting
the juvenile's right, but, that they frequently stipulate to the facts and
seek a particular type of disposition.' 0 ' As a guardian, he is expected to
consider the child's welfare as well as his legal rights,'0 2 and it is in this
phase of counsel's duties that the major qualification of the adversary
system can be visualized. Counsel may well be put in a position which
necessitates a decision on his part concerning the proper treatment to be
afforded to the offender. That is, he may believe that the juvenile is tech-
nically innocent of the specific charges brought against him, but at the
same time, based on the past history of the -juvenile, his environment, and
the nature of his parental supervision, believe it is in the best interests of
the child for him to be removed from his family, whether it be foster
placement or institutional care. 10 3 As a consequence of this type of repre-
sentation, the role of wise parent (parens patriae) has, in effect been
transferred to the law guardian from the court.10 4 At first blush, the law
guardian concept seems to strike the proper tone of counsel's attitude
before the juvenile court, but as in the initial philosophy of the juvenile
courts, this too may not be a realistic substitute fir the adversary system. 05
[The role of counsel in the juvenile courts] will have to be forged
in the crucible of actual experience and in a long range process of
adaptation and accommodation which must inevitably occur between
the lawyer, the social and diagnostic services which are attached to or
utilized by the court and the court itself.' 0 6.
Closely associated with the right to counsel is the problem of effective
waiver of counsel. In the instant case, Mrs. Gault knew that she could
97. Id. at 27.
98. N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 241, 242.
99. Issacs, The Role of the Lawyer In Representing Minors in The New Family
Court, 12 BUFFALO L. Riv. 501, 506 (1963).
100. Id. at 506. This caveat to the juvenile court lawyer may not be necessary.
101. Note, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 281, 326-27 (1967).
102. N.Y. FAMILY Cr. AcT § 241.
103. The Family Court Act draws a distinction between juvenile delinquency and
persons in need of supervision, truancy, ungovernability, etc. N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT
§ 712(a) & (b). Counsel should be aware of the different problems presented as
far as procedure and judicial power are concerned when statutes provide for
this distinction.
104. Issacs, supra note 99, at 507.
105. For a similar proposal, see Handler, supra note 76, at 36.
106. Issacs, su pra note 99, at 502.
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have appeared with counsel at the juvenile hearing.107 By applying the
classic definition of waiver, "an intentional relinquishment or abandon-
ment of a known right or privilege,"108 the Supreme Court concluded
that her knowledge was not sufficient to bring her within this standard,
reasoning that both child and parent had the right to be expressly advised
of the right to counsel and of the right to court appointed counsel if
necessary, or the specific choice of waiver. 109
Inherent in this decision is the need to have both the parent and
child waive counsel. As far as the juvenile is concerned, such a waiver
may be impossible as a matter of law. Considering that an infant is legally
incompetent to act in a number of legal relationships, it would seem to
follow that such rationale could be applied to his actions in juvenile court
proceedings." 0 The lack of sophistication of young offenders, which may
cause them to waive procedural rights without understanding the con-
sequences, has induced the Supreme Court to remark that "formulas of
respect for constitutional safeguards [advising the child only] cannot pre-
vail over the facts of life which contradict them.""' In fact, the Court in
the instant case, and a number of commentators, have noted the desira-
bility of making representation of the juvenile by counsel mandatory." 2
Whatever ramifications this type of requirement may have," 3 the Court
seems to have made it quite plain that, to be effective, the parents as well
as the child must participate in the waiver action.
V. PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
One of the distinctive features of the juvenile courts is the high num-
ber of confessions and admissions. Over a two year period, a survey
revealed that of 3,000 consecutive cases in one court, only five accused
juveniles wholly denied involvement in the offense. 114 Most confessions
occur at the police intake stage 1 5 and many are repeated in the form
of admissions, the juvenile equivalent of a guilty plea, at the adjudicative
hearing."" This prevalance of confessions and admissions has been justified
and explained by the "treatment" rationale or the parens patriae approach,
rather than being attributed to coercive police practices. 117 Confession is
107. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 41, 42.
108. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
109. Issacs, supra note 99, at 502.
110. See Comment, 40 WASH. L. R~v. 189, 200 (1965). For a discussion of the
impossibility of waiver by incompetents see Note, 12 VILL. L. REv. 655 (1967).111. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948). Accord, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370
U.S. 49 (1962).
112. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 38 n.65; Handler, supra note 76, at 33-34.
113. The juvenile may feel it is in his best interests to waive counsel. A purposeful
trial tactic is considered an aspect of waiver. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438(1963) ; Note, 12 VILL. L. Rxv. 655, 659-60 (1967).
114. Alexander, Constitutional Rights in the Juvenile Court, in JusTIcE FOR THE
CHILD) 87 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).
115. Note, 79 HARV. L. Rzv. 775, 789 (1966).
116. Comment, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1171, 1182 (1966).
117. See Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 973 (1955) ; In rc Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 138 P.2d 503 (1943).
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felt to be good for the child," 8 and cooperation with the authorities a civic
duty which should be learned at the earliest age. Furthermore, it has been
asserted that the parents and child should not be advised of the juveniles
right to remain silent at the hearing, in order that he be encouraged to
assume an attitude of trust and confidence in the officials."
9
By attaching the noncriminal rubric to juvenile proceedings, courts
have held that there is no constitutional right to protection against self-
incrimination in the juvenile courts. 12 0 In fact, Pennsylvania's Supreme
Court has held that not only is there no duty to advise the juvenile of the
privilege against self-incrimination, but that the court may require the
juvenile to answer when he does object.' 21 Chief Justice Stern stated that
the juvenile was not being "compelled to testify, he was questioned in the
same manner and in the same spirit as a parent might have acted, for
whom, under the theory of the juvenile court legislation, the State was
substituting.'1 2 2 Decisions of other courts have granted juveniles protec-
tion against self-incrimination, 123 and the recent New York Family Court
Act provides that the parents and the juvenile be advised at the start of
the hearing of the juvenile's right to remain silent, 124 however, these
examples represent a very small minority.
In Gault, the Court disposed of the argument that confessions by
juveniles aid in individualized treatment by pointing to studies that in-
dicate that when children are persuaded by officials to confess, and the
confession is followed by disciplinary action, "the child's reaction is likely
to be hostile and adverse - the child may well feel that he has been
led or tricked into confession, and that despite his confession, he is
being punished."'1 25 Although the Court limited its holding to the adjudi-
cative hearing, 126 Mr. Justice Fortas concluded that the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination is as applicable to juveniles as it is to
adults. Henceforth, a juvenile court judge must advise the parent and
the child of the juvenile's right to remain silent.' 27 The problem of waiver
in this context is similar to that concerning the right to counsel,' 28 and the
Court indicated that the child alone will not be able to waive the privilege. 129
Although the application of the privilege against self-incrimination is
limited to the adjudicative hearing, it is significant that the language used
118. Supra note 111, at 780-81.
119. See In re Gault, supra note 2, at 51; In re Dargo, 81 Cal. App. 2d 205,
183 P.2d 282 (1947).
120. In re Dargo, supra note 119; In re Santillanes, supra note 117; People v.
Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 709 (1933). But see
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964).
121. Holmes' Appeal, supra note 117, at 604, 109 A.2d at 525.
122. Id. at 605, 109 A.2d at 526.
123. See Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269 (1944); In re Tahbel,
46 Cal. App. 755, 189 Pac. 804 (1920).
124. N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 741.
125. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 51, 52.
126. Id. at 44.
127. Id. at 51-54.
128. See text accompanying note 113 supra.
129. Supra note 127.
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in implanting it in the juvenile courts is that of Miranda v. Arizona.130
Both Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Stewart note that Gerald's
admission was not compelled by the juvenile court judge, hence, no issue
of compulsory self-incrimination as stated by the fifth amendment is
presented in this case.' 3' The Court's opinion, however, uses the fifth
amendment as a device to insure the voluntariness of confessions and
admissions. The gap between the fourteenth amendment's ban of coerced
confessions and the privilege against self-incrimination in the fifth amend-
ment was breached in Miranda.'32 That Court, after reviewing the methods
of police interrogation 133 found that no statement from a defendant could
be considered the product of free choice without adequate protective
devices." 4 The Court concluded that the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion is fulfilled only when an individual is guaranteed the right to "remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own
will." 135 Mr. Justice Goldberg, in Escobedo v. Illinois,'3 6 found that police
interrogation is a "critical stage," hence the right to counsel is applicable,
but the limited holding of that case led to conflicting opinions concerning
the necessary procedure mandated by the Court.Is7 The Miranda Court
clarified Escobedo, and the right to be advised of counsel and to remain
silent when an individual is subject to interrogation 138 are now constitu-
tional guidelines for law enforcement agencies. Since the privilege against
self-incrimination is as applicable to juveniles as it is to adults, 3 9 can
In re Gault then be interpreted as the initial step in applying the Miranda
guarantees in the pre-judicial as well as the adjudicative phases of the
juvenile court process?
It should be noted that Gerald Gault had been questioned by the
probation officer after being taken into custody, but any admissions made
at that time did not appear in the record, therefore, the court did not
have to consider this precise question. 40  As previously noted, most
juveniles confess and most of these confessions occur at the pre-judicial
stages.' 41 The first of these stages is the police intake stage where the
130. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
131. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 64, 81. The pertinent part of the fifth amend-
ment reads, "No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself .... U.S. CoNsr. amend. V.
132. See Note, 12 VILL. L. REv. 198 (1966).
133. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-58.
134. Id. at 448.
135. Id. at 460, quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
136. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
137. See Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. Riv. 47 (1964); Comment, 31 U. CH. L. Rzv.
313 (1964).
138. The majority in Miranda declared that these principles apply when an in-
dividual is first subjected to interrogation, whether in custody at the police station or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in anyway. 384 U.S. at 444, 477, 478.
139. Supra note 127.
140. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 43 & n.74.
141. Supra notes 114, 115 and accompanying text.
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role of the police is considerably greater than the mere discretion to
arrest.142 In fact, police operate ad hoc juvenile courts with the result
that large numbers of juveniles arrested for minor offenses are never
brought before the juvenile court. 143 At the same time, this encounter
may result in the creation of an official record with the police or the
court.1 44 A denial of guilt at the police hearing "indicates that the juvenile
is not amenable to these 'non-compulsory approaches' and requires court
referral."' 4 Actually, the police hearing is a very real form of coercion
and probably accounts for a great number of confessions. 14 A second
pre-judicial stage may be instituted by the juvenile court itself. This in-
volves a screening process different from the police process in that the
personnel are usually trained and experienced in social investigation and
are generally under the supervision of the juvenile court. 47 Again, the
practice is to dispense with the formal hearing only when the child admits
his guilt; contested cases are automatically referred to the judge. 148 As
one note points out, the juvenile usually cooperates with the probation officer
or court intake officer at this stage, because he knows that the probation
officer will make recommendations to the court regarding treatment. 1 49
New York's progressive Family Court Act provides that statements
made during the intake hearing are inadmissible in any subsequent judicial
proceeding, however, most states do not provide this protection.150 Need-
less to say, where confessions at the intake level are admissible at the
adjudicative stage, the role of counsel will be severely limited if he is
barred from the intake hearing.
The effect of informal intake procedures can be disastrous for the
juvenile as is evidenced by the instant case. Here the juvenile court judge
based his finding of delinquency in part on the Arizona definition of delin-
quency which includes, one who, as the judge phrased it, is "habitually
involved in immoral matters."' 51 The basis for this finding of habitual
involvement was a "referral" made two years earlier "where the boy had
stolen a baseball glove from another boy and lied to the Police Department
about it."'15 2 No formal action by the juvenile court was ever taken, but
the creation of an official record with the court proved to be consequential.
From this it may be argued that the interrogation by the police had reached
142. See Goldstein, Police Discretion Not To Invoke the Criminal Process:
Lou-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960) ;
La Fave, The Police and Nonenforcement of the Law, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 104, 179.
143. See Comment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1182 (1966).
144. Note, 79 HARV. L. REv. 775, 776-80 (1966).
145. Id. at 781.
146. See generally GOLDMAN, THE DIFFERENTIAL SELECTION OF JUVENILE
OFFENDERS FOR COURT APPEARANCE 131 (1963); WILSON, POLICE PLANNING 134(2d ed. 1957); Tappan, Unofficial Delinquency, 29 NEI. L. REv. 547 (1950).
147. Supra note 144, at 787.
148. Ibid.
149. Comment, 40 WASH. L. REv. 189, 197 (1965).
150. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 735.
151. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 9. ARIZ. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 8-201-6(d) (1956).
152. Ibid.
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a "critical stage" in the proceedings in exactly the same manner as it had
in the proceedings against Danny Escobedo. The Court, in Gault, cited
numerous authorities which have suppressed the involuntary confessions
of juveniles as violative of the fourteenth amendment. 153 These decisions
point out the necessity for applying the Miranda guarantees in the juvenile
courts. In In re Carlo,154 the New Jersey Supreme Court suppressed the
confessions of the juveniles involved, noting that even though they were
advised of their rights before they made their statements this fact should
not be given significant weight in the determination of voluntariness. 155
That court cited Haley v. Ohio'56 where the Supreme Court rejected the
proposition that a fifteen year old boy without the aid of counsel would
have a full appreciation of the advice given him concerning his constitu-
tional rights. It may logically be concluded from these cases that if
Miranda is applied to the juvenile courts, the juvenile will not be allowed
to waive these rights by himself.' 57
In Miranda it was stated that the fifth amendment applies to all situa-
tions where the individual's freedom of action is curtailed by the use of
compulsion to testify against himself.' 58 A recent California decision,
however, has rejected the Miranda guarantees in that state's juvenile
courts. 159 The California Court of Appeals based its decision on the civil
label-of-convenience attached to juvenile proceedings. The court reasoned
that since the proceedings in juvenile court do not constitute a criminal
trial, Miranda does not apply. This type of reasoning has been overruled
by Gault, in that it specifically states that the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation is as applicable to juveniles as it is to adults. 60 However, caution
must be exercised in extending the applicability of the privilege' 6' in
light of the Court's reluctance to consider any issues relevant to the other-
than-adjudicatory phases of the juvenile court process. 1 62
153. E.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 586 (1948) ; United States v. Morales, 233 F.
Supp. 160 (D. Mont. 1964) ; In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966) ; In re W.,
19 N.Y.2d 55, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 224 N.E.2d 102 (1966).
154. 48 N.J. 224, 225 A.2d 110 (1966).
155. Id. at 241-42, 225 A.2d at 120.
156. 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948).
157. Comment, 7 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 114, 127 (1966). See Gallegos v.
Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 52 (1962). But see Commonwealth v. Washington, (Docket
No. 402) Philadelphia Quarter Sessions Ct., June 29, 1967, where it was held that
In re Gault does not require the presence of counsel or parents during interrogation
and that age is only one factor to be considered in the determination of the efficacy
of the juvenile's waiver of counsel. This case can be distinguished from Gault by
the fact that the seventeen year old defendant was not tried in juvenile court but in
a criminal court.
158. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
159. In re Castro, 243 Cal. App. 2d 402, 52 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1966).
160. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 55. However, the Court also stated thatjuvenile proceedings to determine delinquency would be considered "criminal" for
purposes of the fifth amendment. Pre-judicial stages conceivably may not be con-
sidered "criminal" for the privilege. Id. at 49.
161. See In re Gault, supra note 2, at 30 n.87, and accompanying text for a
favorable comment concerning Miranda.
162. For a discussion of the right to bail in the juvenile courts see Antieau,
Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 387 (1961); Paulsen,
Fairness To The Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REv. 547, 552 (1957); Note, 29
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If Miranda is not employed in the juvenile courts, statutes similar to
those of New York's Family Court Act and the Standards for Juvenile
and Family Courts may have to be enacted as devices to insure the volun-
tariness of confessions. The New York statute provides that the police
must attempt to communicate with the juvenile's parents before question-
ing him 163 and that a confession may not be obtained before such notifica-
tion.1 64 As the Supreme Court notes, the Standards for Juvenile and
Family Courts mandate that before being interviewed by the police, the
child and his parents should be informed of his right to have legal counsel
present and to refuse to answer questions or to be fingerprinted.1 65 There-
fore, the Court's argument - that the appearance and actuality of fair-
ness, may be more therapeutic to the juvenile than the prior informality -
may have even greater validity when applied to the pre-judicial stages.
It is here that the juvenile has his first contact with the instrumentalities
of the state, and it is here that his attitude will first be formed.1 66 Fair-
ness at the pre-judicial stage may help develope the respect and confidence
that the juvenile courts wish to instill at the adjudicatory level.
VI. CONFRONTATION, CROSS-EXAMINATION, AND
SWORN TESTIMONY
The Constitutional right of confrontation, which includes the right of
cross-examination 67 and the procedural requirement of sworn testimony,
has been denied by both federal 68 and state courts' 69 in juvenile court
proceedings. Justification for this practice has been the parens patriae170
rationale which has been used to deny the juvenile a host of other rights.
In addition to the belief that the juvenile court would be more efficient if
it were not inhibited by needless formalities, other reasons have been
advanced for the deletion of the right to confrontation and its progeny.
Persons appearing in juvenile court as witnesses often bear unique rela-
tionships to the child, which are deemed reason in themselves for denying
the child these rights. Parental authority has been acknowledged to
have a greater scope than that of any governmental agency, 171 and to
subject parents to cross-examination by the child could obviously impair
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 583 (1961). For a discussion of public hearings in the same
context see Note, 67 COLUM. L. Rtv. 281 (1967) ; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
267-68 (1948).
163. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 724.
164. See In re Addison, 20 App. Div. 2d 90, 245 N.Y.S.2d 243 (1963).
165. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 49, quoting CHILDREN'S BUREAU, UNITED STATES
DEP'T HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, STANDARDS VOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY
COURTS, No. 437-1966, 73 (1966).
166. See KENNEDY & PURSUIT, POLICE WORK WITH JUVENILES (1954).
167. United States v. Cardillo, 316 F.2d 606, 610 (2d Cir. 1963).
168. White v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954). Cf. Pee v. United States,
274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
169. E.g., Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 89, 121 A. 678, 685 (1923).
170. State v. Christensen, 119 Utah 361, 227 P.2d 760, 761 (1951) ; State v.
Scholl, 167 Wis. 504, 167 N.W. 830, 832 (1918).
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this authority. Probation officers charged with the responsibility of re-
habilitating the child have suggested that being subjected to a rigorous
cross-examination would severely curtail their effectiveness, destroy sources
of information, and force disclosures which might result in psychological
harm to the child.172 This latter reason is also the justification offered
for receiving testimony in the absence of the child, whether from the pro-
bation officer or others. 173
The underlying rationale for the denial of these rights has been subject
to widespread criticism by legal writers 174 and courts, although the latter
have been reluctant to base such criticism on constitutional grounds.
Instead, they have based their decisions on an interpretation of the local
juvenile court act and the belief that cross-examination is necessary to
determine the true facts. 175 In In re Sippy, a mother petitioned the court
to have her daughter institutionalized as "uncontrollable." The court
ruled that testimony must be given under oath and that the failure of the
mother to exercise the right of cross-examination was not sufficient to deny
the child such right, since their interests obviously conflicted.'" This
analysis has also been applied to the testimony of the probation officer. 177
Although few courts have specifically articulated a position on the
right of confrontation, they have addressed themselves to the closely
related problem of the admissibility of hearsay evidence in juvenile court
proceedings. However, no general statement can be made in this area
since the solutions of the courts which have faced the problem have run
the gamut from employment of the standards applicable to a criminal trial,
to the free admission of all testimony.' 78 The Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania' 79 has held that since the child was only charged with delinquency,
"the juvenile court may, in order to accomplish the purposes for which
juvenile court legislation is designed, avoid many of the legalistic features
of the rules of evidence customarily applicable to other judicial hearings." 180
The court acknowledged the rules of hearsay, specifying that it should be
barred if objections were properly raised,' 8 ' but, since counsel has either
been denied or not obtained in most cases, this decision's practical effect
172. Id. at 609. See also Krasnow, Social Investigation Report in Juvenile Court;
Their Uses and Abuses, 12 CRIME AND DFLINQUENCY 157 (1966); Rosenheim,
Privilege, Confidentiality, and Juvenile Offender, 11 WAYNE L. Rnv. 660 (1965).
173. Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. Rw. 547, 560-61
(1957).
174. Id. at 566. See Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Court, 46 CORNELL
L.Q. 387, 403 (1961).
175. In re Cromwell, 232 Md. 409, 194 A.2d 88 (1963) ; In re Mantell, 157 Neb.
900, 62 N.W.2d 308 (1954) ; In re Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952) ;
In re Hill, 78 Cal. App. 23, 27, 247 Pac. 591, 592 (1926). But see In re Poff, supra
note 17 and accompanying text.
176. 97 A.2d 455 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C. '1953).
177. Ballard v. State, 192 S.W.2d 329, 332 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
178. In re Rich, 125 Vt, 373, 375, 216 A.2d 266, 268 (1966). See also Note, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 281, 335-39 (1967) ; Note, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 341 (1964) ; Note,
114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1196 (1966).
179. Holmes' Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
973 (1955).
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has been very limited.' s2 Other courts, which have not been persuaded by
the change in nomenclature of the charge, or the prophesied results of a
juvenile court hearing, require that evidence be tested by rules applicable
in criminal'8 3 or civil trials. 8 4
The social investigation report,185 prepared by probation officers in
the period between the filing of a petition and the hearing, is the most
frequent source of hearsay evidence which is admitted in the adjudicative
proceeding. In Pennsylvania, of the juvenile court judges surveyed, 8 6
sixty-eight per cent reported that they review this report prior to the
hearing and fifty-six per cent use it in adjudication, though it is replete
with hearsay. Furthermore, in sixty per cent of the cases the probation
officer who prepared the report is not present at the hearing 8 7 This
practice has been justified on the grounds that since the majority of juvenile
cases are held without a jury, 8 it can be presumed that the judge has
ignored all incompetent evidence and that the ruling that results should
be sustained wherever sufficient admissible evidence has been introduced. 89
Since the social investigation report is admissible at disposition, its intro-
duction during adjudication has not been considered error.190 One court
has held that, "the report of the probation officer became a judicial record
when it was filed with the juvenile court and that court not only had the
right but the duty to consider it in deciding the case."'' 1 However, in
other jurisdictions, such decisions have not gone unchallenged. For
example, it has been held to be reversible error for the trial court to con-
sider ex parte investigations made by the probation office on a disputed
issue of fact.19 2
Two recent legislative enactments have taken different tacks in estab-
lishing rules of evidence for juvenile court proceedings. The California
act permits the admission of all "relevant and material evidence,"'198 but a
finding of custody can be based only on evidence admissible at a criminal
trial. 9 4 The New York act restricts evidence to that which is "competent,
182. See Shioutakon v. D.C., 236 F.2d 666, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1956), where the court
points out that the child would have to be a legal genius to exercise legal rights
without counsel.
183. E.g., In re Carlo, 48 N.J. 224, 237, 225 A.2d 110, 117 (1966) ; People v.
Fitzgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 315-16, 155 N.E. 584, 587 (1927).
184. E.g., In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 241 P.2d 631 (1952).
185. See infra, note 254 and accompanying text.
186. See Appendix.
187. Ibid.
188. Note, supra note 178, at 285.
189. Mont Appeal, 175 Pa. Super. 150, 156-57, 103 A.2d 460, 463 (1954) ; In re
Gonzalez, 328 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); In re Bently, 246 Wis. 69,
16 N.W.2d 390 (1944).
190. In re Brown, 201 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
191. In re Garcia, 201 Cal. App. 2d 662, 665, 20 Cal. Rptr. 313, 315 (1962).
192. In re Barkus, 168 Neb. 257, 261-62, 95 N.W.2d 674, 677 (1959). See material
cited supra note 178.
193. CAL. WZLFARX & INST'NS CODZ § 701. For judicial interpretation see In re
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material and relevant,"' 95 a standard which also appears in the Children's
Bureau's Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts.196
The foregoing reveals that neither courts nor legislatures, in attempt-
ing to arrive at a juvenile court system which is fundamentally fair to
the child have been in accord as to the necessity of incorporating the rights
of confrontation and cross-examination.
The Arizona Supreme Court, in the Application of Gault,197 was
cognizant of the problems posed in this area, and after analyzing the
decisions reached by courts in other jurisdictions, determined that con-
frontation was only required when the child denied the charges. 19 Hearsay
would be admissible, but "must be of a kind on which reasonable men are
accustomed to rely in serious affairs, ' ' 199 and sworn testimony only would
be necessary from those witnesses who maintain some official relationship
to the court.200 While the Arizona court was convinced that with these
modifications the child's rights would not be impaired, the United States
Supreme Court felt otherwise, and held that the child cannot be denied
the constitutional right of confrontation and the opportunity to test the
evidence by cross-examination where the possibility of incarceration in
a state institution exists.20 1 However, where the child has made a valid
confession, these protections are unnecessary, since the hearing is only
held to arrive at a proper disposition.2 0 2 It should be noted that if this
decision is read narrowly, it does not determine whether a child who is
placed on probation, and is therefore subject to the discipline of the court,
is entitled to these protections.
In imposing these standards, the Court relied on the recommenda-
tions of the Children's Bureau, 20 3 which characterize the proceedings in
juvenile court as civil 20 4 in nature. This reliance makes it clear that the
195. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 744(a). (Emphasis added.) For judicial interpre-
tation see In re Anonymous, 37 Misc. 2d 827, 831, 238 N.Y.S.2d 792, 797 (1962).
196. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. D9P'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS, No. 437-1966, 73 (1966). But see
STANDARD JUVtNILE COURT ACT § 19 (1959) and comment thereto in 51 NPPA
JOURNAL 323, 367-71 (1959), where it is suggested that rules of evidence should be
left to appellate court decisions.
197. 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965).
198. Id. at 191, 407 P.2d at 768.
199. Id. at 192, 407 P.2d at 768.
200. Ibid.
201. In re Gault, supra note 2, at
202. Ibid. This holding implies that the Court will adhere to the position it took
in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
A sentencing judge, however, is not confined to the narrow issue of guilt. His
task within fixed statutory or constitutional limits is to determine the type and
extent of punishment after the issue of guilt has been determined. Highly
relevant - if not essential - to his selection of an appropriate sentence is the
possession of the fullest information possible concerning the defendant's life and
characteristics. And modern concepts individualizing punishment have made it all
the more necessary that a sentencing judge not be denied an opportunity to obtain
pertinent information by a requirement of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of
evidence properly applicable to the trial.
Id at 247.
203. STANDARDS FOR JUVtNIL AND FAMILY COURTS, supra note 196, at 73.
204. Ibid.
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court chose to avoid the rigid standards of Pointer v. Texas, 20 5 a criminal
case. However, the Court's citation to Willner v. Committee on Char-
acter,20 6 a quasi-judicial hearing, may be instructive in ascertaining the
proper application of the confrontation clause in the juvenile courts.
The circumstances will determine the necessary limits and in-
cidents implicit in the concept of a "fair" hearing. Thus, for example,
when the derogatory matter appears from information supplied or
confirmed by the applicant himself, or is of an undisputed documentary
character disclosed to the applicant, and it is plain and uncontradicted
that the committee's recommendation against admission is predicated
thereon and reasonably supported thereby, then neither the committee's
informal procedures, its ultimate recommendations, nor a court ruling
sustaining the committee's conclusion may be properly challenged on
due process grounds, provided the applicant has been informed of the
factual basis of the conclusion and has been afforded an adequate
opportunity to reply or explain. Of course, if the denial depends
upon information supplied by a particular person whose reliability
or veracity is brought into question by the applicant, confrontation
and the right of cross-examination should be afforded.20 7
If indeed this statement is applicable to the instant case, it is clear that
the juvenile court is still left with broad discretion in this area. Gault
does not require strict formality, nor does it require the preclusion of all
hearsay in attaining fairness for the child at the hearing. It necessarily
follows therefore, that the liberalization of the admission of hearsay in
other judicial proceedings may also be applicable to juvenile hearings. 2°8
The use of the social investigation report prior to and in adjudication will
come under close scrutiny, 20 9 but if the child and his attorney are made
aware of its use, are given an opportunity to refute its contents, and call
witnesses where necessary, its admission should not be prohibited.
The effect of Gault in the area of testimony seems to be that the
juvenile court judge can no longer rely on the protective cloak of the
parens patriae doctrine in arbitrarily determining what evidence is to be
considered, but must adhere to certain rules of evidence and procedure.
Persons who are witnesses to the acts in question will no longer be able
to relate their observations to a probation officer and remain anonymous,
but, where the youth is subject to possible incarceration, they must appear
and sustain their position under oath and subject to cross-examination.
205. 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ; see Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule, 75 YALE L.
Rzv. 1434 (1966).
206. 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
207. Id. at 107-08 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
208. Paulsen, supra note 173, at 565.
209. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JusTICE, "THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SociETY" 87(1967), cited at 387 U.S. 57 n.98, which recommends the social investigation report
not be made available to the judge at adjudication.
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VII. APPELLATE REVIEW AND TRANSCRIPT
OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Since the inception of the juvenile court procedure, state courts have
consistently taken the position that the right to appellate review exists
only where provided for by statute.2 10 The Supreme Court in Griffin v.
Illinois,211 a criminal case, reaffirmed the view212 that the right to an
appeal is not guaranteed by the Constitution since it is not a part of the
common law, nor "a necessary element of due process of law. '213 Rather,
appellate court review is a discretionary matter for the state legislatures
to determine.214 While this conclusion has been widely followed it has
not gone without criticism, and it has been appropriately suggested that
the question of whether the child has received fair treatment at the hearing
is difficult to answer absent appellate review, since lack of appeal renders
the proceedings largely free of supervision. 215
Closely akin to the problem of appellate review is the question of the
type of record, if any, which must be kept of the juvenile proceedings.
Records of the proceedings are required in many states by statute,216
but what constitutes an adequate record apparently differs in various juris-
dictions. 21 7 If the record is incomplete or nonexistent, the possibility of
obtaining adequate review is severely limited218 and this factor may be a
reason for the small number of appeals in juvenile court. In the case at
bar, the Arizona Supreme Court 219 held that there is no right to a tran-
script for two reasons. Since there is no right of appeal, it logically
follows that there is little need for a transcript ;220 and secondly, the
Arizona statute requires that the hearing be confidential and all records
destroyed after a prescribed time.2 21 It concluded that in view of these two
considerations, whether a transcript is made is a matter for the discretion
of the juvenile court.222
The Supreme Court did not rule on the questions of appellate review
or provision for transcript for it had already decided that the Arizona
210. E.g., Wissenberg v. Bradley, 209 Iowa 813, 821, 229 N.W. 205, 209 (1930).
But see Ginn v. Superior, In and For County Prima, 1 Ariz. App. 455, 404 P.2d 721(1965), where the court examined case law and statutes of various jurisdictions
dealing with appellate review in juvenile court.
211. 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
212. McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
213. Id. at 687.
214. Id. at 687, 688.
215. Note, 79 HARV. L. Rv. 775, 799 (1966).
216. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 245 (1965); N.Y. FAMILY CT. AcT § 745;
UTAH CODe ANN. § 55-10-96 (1965).
217. Note, supra note 215.
218. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
219. Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. 181, 407 P.2d 760 (1965).
220. Id. at 192, 407 P.2d at 768.
221. Ibid. Critics have contended that confidential is a very loosely defined word
in some jurisdictions. See Elson, Juvenile Courts and Due Process, in JUsTICE FOR
THE CHILD 95, 110-11 (Rosenheim ed. 1962) ; Note, supra note 215, at 800.
222. Application of Gault, 99 Ariz. at 192, 407 P.2d at 768.
[VOL. 12
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decision demanded reversal. 223 However, the Court intimated that the
absence of such rights might precipitate severe problems in subsequent
habeas corpus proceedings where the juvenile court judge may be required
to testify under cross-examination concerning the events that occurred in
his courtroom, in order that it may be determined whether the juvenile was
afforded due process of law as required by the instant case. 224 This predic-
tion of the Court concerning the increased burden on the habeas corpus
procedure is almost guaranteed to be realized by the portions of the opinion
that require counsel, confrontation, and cross-examination. As the num-
ber of attorneys involved in juvenile matters has increased in recent years,
the number of appeals has also risen,225 and it can be safely concluded that
Gault will but accelerate this trend.
VIII. THE DISPOSITIONAL PROCESS
In re Gault requires that certain constitutional requisites be met in
the adjudicative phase of the juvenile court process, and although recog-
nizing that the treatment promised is often not received, 220 the Court
chose not to call for these same safeguards in the unique dispositional
phase of that process. 227 This choice indicates recognition by the Court
that this phase offers the greatest possibility of implementing the original
goals of the juvenile court system and, if properly conducted, need not
be governed by the more formalized adjudication procedures. Personalized
justice leading to individualized treatment and rehabilitation, without the
stigma of criminality, was the innovation which led to the juvenile court's
rapid acceptance in the United States.228 However, in order for this con-
cept to have continued vitality, it must prove to be practical, that is, it
must be molded in such a way as to strike the proper balance between the
protection of the community and rehabilitation of the child.229
When the adjudication process has been concluded with a finding
of delinquency, the attorney is faced with what may prove to be an en-
tirely unfamiliar task, that of adequately representing his juvenile client
in the dispositional phase of the proceeding. His situation is further com-
plicated by the fact that Gault does not make the appearance of the attorney
in the dispositional phase mandatory. 230 In order to be an attribute in this
223. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 58.
224. Ibid. The Court cites with approval the standards recommended in the
STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS, supra note 196, at 8, which suggests
"written findings of fact," some form of record of the hearing "and the right
to appeal."
225. Interview with Juvenile Division, Community Legal Services of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, Nov. 1966. See Elson, Juvenile Courts and Due Process, supra note 221.
226. In re Gault, supra note 2, at 22-23 n.30.
227. Id. at 13.
228. Ketcham, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Juvenile Court, in JUSTICE FOR 'rE
CHILD 22, 24-25 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).
229. Allen, The Juvenile Court and the Limits of Juvenile Justice, 11 WAYNE L.
REv. 676, 684 (1965).
230. But see In re Gault, supra note 2, at 38-40 n.65. Recent decisions of Pennsyl-
vania courts have found in criminal cases that the sentencing hearing is a "critical
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process, counsel must compliment his legal expertise with a familiarization
with the behavioral sciences that play such a large role in the final out-
come. 23 1 The attorney can no longer limit his preparation to the adjudica-
tory phase of the proceeding, since the dispositional phase often proves to
be the most crucial for his client. 232 Therefore, the following discussion
will attempt to acquaint the attorney with the factors that must be con-
sidered and the tools that must be employed in effectively representing his
juvenile client. With this objective in mind, the juvenile courts of the
Philadelphia metropolitan area, operating under the Pennsylvania Juvenile
Court Act,233 were examined.
A. The Participants - Child, Parents, Probation
Officer, Judge
Children who are brought before the juvenile court on delinquency
charges cannot be stereotyped. Although youths from lower socio-economic
groups appear more frequently before the court, for a variety of reasons,
delinquency touches all classes of our society.2 34 Within the encompassing
standards of delinquency, 235 both the youthful prankster and the sophisti-
cated young criminal may face the authority of the same court. The
juvenile court judge, having broad discretionary powers in determining
proper disposition, 236 may merely caution the child or confine the youth in
an institution until the age of twenty-one. If the child, even though recog-
nizing that his acts justify the exercise of authority by the court, believes
that the disposition is unfair, it may only serve to re-enforce his anti-social
conduct,2 37 and the latitude of possible dispositions and the responses they
may evoke in the child, demonstrate that the dispositional phase is as
important as the adjudicatory phase in the juvenile court.
The parents' relationship with the child has a strong bearing on the
disposition arrived at by the juvenile court. Recommendations of the
probation department and the election by the judge between probation and
institutionalization may depend, in large measure, on the parents' ability
and desire to effectively supervise and assist their child.238 In fact, the
disposition of the child often leads to a disposition of the parents. That is,
if the child is removed from their custody, the court can order the parents
stage" in which the convicted party is entitled to counsel. Commonwealth ex rel.
Johnson v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 451, 452, 206 A.2d 322, 323 (1965). See Commonwealth
ex rel. Miller v. Myers, 206 Pa. Super. 84, 86, 211 A.2d 87, 88 (1965).
231. Ketcham, Legal Renaissance in the Juvenile Court, 60 Nw. U.L. Rtv. 585,
598 (1965).
232. Handler, The Juvenile Court And The Adversary System: Problems Of
Function And Form, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 7, 34.
233. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, §§ 243-68 (1965).
234. See WHEELER & COTTRELL, supra note 87, at 11-14. See generally NEU11MYtR,
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY IN MODERN SOCIETY (3d ed. 1961).
235. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 243 (1965).
236. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250 (1965).
237. Neumeyer, supra note 234, at 26; Studt, The Client's Image of the Juvenile
Court, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 200-01 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).
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to pay support, 23 9 and whether the child remains within the home or is
placed elsewhere, traditional concepts of parental rights and authority
will be modified.2 40
The Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Act has created a probation depart-
ment, under judicial supervision, which functions as an administrative arm
of the court, 241 and the importance of the individual probation officer who
plays a significant role in all phases of the juvenile court process should
not be underestimated. It is his responsibility to prepare the social investi-
gation report which is a vital factor in determining the initial disposition
of the child,2 42 and whether a final order of the juvenile court will be later
modified, thereby imposing more severe restrictions on, or removing all
court supervision from, the child, will often turn on the opinions expressed
by the probation officer. It is therefore evident that he must be well
trained243 and have the ability to establish a rapport with the child in
order to fulfill his role adequately.
The probation officer should attend all proceedings held in juvenile
court pertaining to a child under his supervision. In Delaware County,
Pennsylvania, the probation officer who prepared the report and who will
later be assigned to the child is required to attend the hearing, whereas,
Philadelphia County merely has a representative of the probation office
present, while the probation officer who prepared the social investigation
report attends only at the request of the judge or voluntarily.2 44
The juvenile court judge is charged with the responsibility of balanc-
ing all of the complex factors which determine the disposition of the
child. He must be capable of evaluating the problems and needs of the
individual child and of determining appropriate action if the child's con-
duct poses a threat to the community.24 Furthermore, this must be accom-
239. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 251 (1965).
240. STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS, supra note 196, at 16-17.
241. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 259 (1965).
242. Infra note 250 and accompanying text.
243. See JUVENILE COURT JUDcSs' COMM'N, D4P'T O JUSTICE, COMMONWEALTH
Ol PENNSYLVANIA, JUVENILE COURT HANDBOOK AND DIRECTORY 35 (1965) (herein-
after cited as PA. Juv. CT. HANDBOOK) which sets forth as the minimum standards
that the probation officer candidate must have a Bachelor's degree from an accredited
college or university, and minimum scores in attitude, appitude, and special tests on
the subject of juvenile probation as determined by the individual juvenile courts in
the state. (Delaware County's staff is composed of college graduates with degrees
in sociology who either have, or are working toward, a masters degree in this field.
Philadelphia County has a staff of college graduates, not necessarily in sociology.)
See NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE Ass'N, STANDARDS FOR SELECTION OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE PERSONNEL, in DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND
PAROLE 221 (2d ed. 1962).
244. Although attending the hearings is listed as a function of the probation officer,
it apparently is open to interpretation whether this requires the probation officer who
prepared the report to attend. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 259 (1965) ; PA. JuV.
CT. HANDBOOK, supra note 243, at 35, where it states that the probation officer
assigned to a child is required to attend the child's hearing. In evaluating the
Delaware County and Philadelphia County practices it should be noted that the
average case load per month for a probation officer is eighty-five in Philadelphia
County and fifty in Delaware County.
245. Tappan, Juridical & Administrative Approaches to Children with Problems,
in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 144, 147-49 (Rosenheim ed. 1962) ; Eastman, The Juvenile
Court Judge's Job, 5 NPPA JOURNAL 414 (1959).
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plished under the scrutiny of the public, which either criticizes the de-
cisions reached as being too lenient or too harsh.246 It has been suggested
that although the judge may be best equipped to make an adjudication
of delinquency, he may not be an expert on disposition, and that an
agency which employs trained personnel will be in a more advantageous
position to assimilate the continually more sophisticated data supplied
by the psychiatrist, sociologist, psychologist, and caseworker, and apply
it properly.247 However, to remove the judge from the process of disposi-
tion fails to recognize that there must be an adjudication of delinquency,
the result of which may remove the child from society or regulate his
activities within the community, and limit the parents' custody of the child.
A decision of this magnitude should be the responsibility of the judiciary. 248
B. The Social Investigation Report
Rehabilitation of the child requires a determination of the factors
leading to the child's delinquent behavior. This is a complicated process,
for "to explain juvenile misconduct one must analyze the condition of the
individual involved, the influence of the social world in which he lives
and the sequence of occurrences that precede the deviation from societal
norms and laws. '249 It is the function of the social investigation report
to gather and synthesize the data for this analysis and to balance the
child's needs against those of the community, so that the juvenile court
judge can render an appropriate decision. 250 A recommended format for
the report in Pennsylvania 251 which lists major headings as: Complaint,
Previous Court or Institutional History, Family Background, Child's His-
tory, Information from Social Agencies and Others, Analysis, Interpre-
tation and Recommendations, demonstrates the complexity of the report.
The survey25 2 conducted in conjunction with this note indicates that
this report is used without exception by those judges who responded in
arriving at disposition. The importance of the dispositional recommenda-
tion of the report is also manifested by the fact that the jurists' disposi-
tional orders coincide with the recommendations contained in the report
on an average of eighty-three per cent, varying from a high in Delaware
County of ninety-three per cent, to a low of seventy-three per cent in
246. Address by Hon. W. Clarence Sheely, Judge of the fifty-first Judicial District,
at the Eleventh Judicial Conference of Pennsylvania, May 6, 1960.
247. Kahn, Court and Community, in JUSTICE FOR THE CHILD 217, 228 (Rosen-
heim ed. 1962).
248. Supra note 245.
249. NEUM4Y4R, supra note 234, at 73.
250. The social study is a written report to the judge by the probation officer.
It contains a narrative account of the child's life history with special emphasis on
those factors which have resulted in the child's present problems and delinquent
behavior. An evaluation of the child's potential social adjustment is included in
this report. Its purpose is to help the court understand and individualize the
child so that a disposition can be made that will both meet the child's rehabilitative
need and protect the community. PA. Juv. CT. HANDBOOK 38.
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Philadelphia County.2 53 This variance is probably due to the fact that the
probation officer in Delaware County always attends the hearings, and
therefore, plays a more active role in the dispositional proceedings. He
is able to answer questions posed by the judge in regard to the recom-
mendations in the report and undoubtedly adds to their persuasiveness. 254
C. Evaluation of, and Access to, the Social
Investigation Report
Without access to the report, it is doubtful that the attorney can
effectively represent his juvenile client at disposition. However, the
reasons asserted for nondisclosure of the report at adjudication are equally
applicable at disposition - protection of the probation officer's sources
of information, confidential nature of the communications, preservation
of the relationship established between the child and his probation officer,
and the possibility that some information, if disclosed, could harm the
child psychologically. Proponents of disclosur&55 suggest that recognition
of the importance of the report in respect to the child's future requires
that it be subject to evaluation by the child's attorney, with the judge having
discretion to determine what information is to be available to the child.25 6
Those who feel that nondisclosure is the better view may find some
support in the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. New York 257
where it was held that in a criminal presentencing hearing, due process
was not denied when the convicted criminal was not afforded the right
to confront and cross-examine persons whose statements were contained
in a pre-sentence report, even where the judge admittedly relied on the
report in determining the sentence.258 In the judicial search for a proper
sentence, it was felt that the judge should be given broad discretion, how-
ever, the Court did not determine that the defendant is without an
opportunity to challenge the accuracy of the statements relied on by the
judge. 25 9 Therefore, this decision may be of limited significance in regard
to the attorney's right of access to the social investigation report.
In Pennsylvania, the Juvenile Court Act provides that the records of
the proceedings260 in the juvenile court be made available to the parents,
or representative of the child or all persons with a legitimate interest. In
regard to this provision, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Holmes'
253. Ibid.
254. Paul E. Gresregan, Chief Juvenile Probation Officer of Delaware County
stated, "If my department's recommendations are not followed ninety per cent of the
time, my department is not doing its job properly." Interview with Paul E. Gres-
regan, Nov. 1966.
255. Allison, Counsel in the Juvenile Court, FZDERAL PROBATION XXX, 28
(March 1966) ; Handler, The Juvenile Court And The Adversary System: Problems
Of Function And Form, 1965 Wis. L. Rev. 7; Krasnow, supra note 172.
256. Krasnow, supra note 172.
257. 337 U.S. 241 (1949). See also Note, 67 COLUm. L. Rev. 281, 337-39 (1967)
Note, 58 COLUM. L. Rev. 702, 712-15 (1958).
258. 337 U.S. at 244.
259. 337 U.S. at 243.
260. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 245 (1965).
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Appeal2 1 held that the social investigation report was not part of the
juvenile court record of the proceedings, and therefore, not governed by
the statute. Relying on Williams, it decided that disclosure should be
left to judicial discretion.2 62
The juvenile probation office of Delaware County has asserted that
they would be quite willing to have attorneys review their reports, but
so few attorneys demonstrate an understanding of the philosophy and
purpose of the juvenile court that the report would be of little value to
them.263 Judge Clifford Scott Green 2 4 of the County Court of Phila-
delphia stated that he permits attorneys to see the reports and in fact has
suggested to attorneys appearing before him the necessity of reading the
reports. He added, however, that not all of his colleagues are in agree-
ment with his position. In an interview with the Juvenile Division of the
Community Legal Services Office of Philadelphia, 265 the accuracy of
Judge Green's statement was borne out. It was related that some judges
have refused attorneys' requests for access to the reports, and in other
cases the apparent criteria is how well known the individual attorney is
to the probation office. On many occasions access to the report is limited
to the probation officer's selected readings from the report, a procedure
which is wholly unsatisfactory to the child's attorney.
The future availability of the social investigation report to the attorney
and his role in the dispositional phase of the juvenile court process may be
inferred from this statement of the Supreme Court in Kent v. United
States:
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' statement, attempt-
ing to justify denial of access to these records, that counsel's role is
limited to presenting "to the court anything on behalf of the child
which might help the court in arriving at a decision; it is not to
denigrate the staff's submissions and recommendations." On the con-
trary, if the staff's submissions include materials which are susceptible
to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of counsel to
"denigrate" such matter. There is no irrebutable presumption of the
accuracy attached to staff reports.26
6
Access to the social investigation report will not, by itself, provide the
attorney with sufficient information to protect his client's interests. The
evaluation of the report requires not only a knowledge of what it contains,
but an understanding of what it should contain. He must be capable of
challenging the accuracy of the report by pointing out factual errors, and
if necessary, by bringing to the attention of the court the inadequate
preparation of, or imperfect technique employed by, the probation officer.
Equally important is the addition of information which has been garnered
261. 379 Pa. 599, 607-08, 109 A.2d 523, 526 (1954).
262. Id. at 608, 109 A.2d at 527.
263. Interview with Paul E. Gresregan, supra note 254.
264. Interview with Judge Clifford Scott Green, Nov. 1966.
265. Interview with Director, Juvenile Division, Community Legal Services,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Nov. 1966.
266. 383 U.S. 541, 563 (1966).
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through the attorney-client relationship, and the highlighting of those
aspects of the report which are favorable to the child. 267 The attorney
who recognizes the importance of the social investigation report and how
it can be effectively employed on behalf of his client will be able to make
a substantial contribution to the dispositional process.
D. The Attorney as a Proponent of Possible Dispositions
Unlike the criminal court, which considers deterrence, retribution,
and rehabilitation in the sentencing process, the juvenile court is required
to limit sentencing considerations to the rehabilitation of the individual
child and the protection of the community. 268  It is the responsibility of
the juvenile court judge to consider the needs of the individual child and
make a determination as to whether rehabilitation can be achieved by
probation, or if institutionalization is required.26 9
In choosing the latter course, it must be recognized that the problems
of rehabilitating the child within an institution are manifold. For large
institutions to operate efficiently the daily routines must be regimented
in much the same way as a factory operates its assembly lines. However,
such regimentation is not in accord with the theory and practice of in-
dividualized treatment and it has been found that children in such institu-
tions receive less of the needed treatment than is prescribed.2 70 The
desirability of removing children from contacts with adult criminals can be
accomplished by institutions for juveniles, but it cannot overcome contacts
with other delinquents and the corresponding influence of peer groups.271
Also, lack of trained personnel and adequate facilities may make the insti-
tution unsuitable for rehabilitation, 272 not to mention the increased cost of
institutional care.273
Irrespective of the desires of the court, the stigma of delinquency does
exist and will be a greater burden on the child who has been institution-
alized. Furthermore, removal from the community has a psychological
impact on the child which may retard the rehabilitation process. Recent
decisions have recognized these problems and have indicated that in select-
ing an institution, the juvenile court is required to find a place which, in
fact, affords the promised treatment and is apart from an adult prison.2 7 4
267. Allison, supra note 255, at 28; Krasnow, supra note 172.
268. Ketcham, supra note 228, at 35.
269. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250 (1965).
270. Pound, The Rise of Socialized Justice, NATIONAL PROBATION AND PAROLE
ASSOCIATION YEARBOOK 15 (1942), in CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T or HEALTH,
EDUCATION AND WELFARE, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY, No. 9, How ErFEcTIvE ARE
SERVICES FOR THE TREATMENT or DELINQUENTS? 1, n.2 (1960).
271. It has been suggested that institutional living reinforces deviant behavior
and in fact creates pressures on the child to seek more deviant conduct. See Grygier,
The Concept of the "State of Delinquency" and Its Consequences for the Treatment
of Young Offenders, 11 WAYNE L. REv. 627, 646 (1965).
272. See Neumeyer, supra note 234, at 352-54.
273. STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURTS, supra note 196, at 82, states
that a national survey revealed that the average cost per year of probation is $200
to $250 per child, whereas the cost of institutional care ranges from $2,760 to
over $4,000.
274. E.g., Creek v. Stone, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 2645 (D.C. Cir., May 1, 1967) ; White
v. Reid, 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
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Pennsylvania has twenty-nine institutions available for the housing of
juvenile delinquents. 275 Included in this number are sixteen which are
privately operated, although in many instances they receive state or county
support, and three which provide for commitment by both the juvenile
and criminal court. The juvenile court can obviously order that the child
be placed in a state institution, however when placement in a private
institution is deemed best, the child must meet the standards established by
the institution in question, such as the attainment of a minimum score in
intelligence testing. A survey27i conducted in 1954 reported that juvenile
facilities varied from medium security prisons, with minimal educational
programs, to cottage type facilities with slight custodial functions, and a
variety of academic, industrial arts, and vocational training programs.
The report criticized the institutions in Pennsylvania because in many
cases, the physical plant was old and in poor condition and because there
was a lack of sufficient teachers, social workers, trained psychiatrists, and
psychologists. In addition, it was found that there was very little, if any,
in service training of the staff, and that even though the available staff
strived to rehabilitate the children, the lack of financial support made it diffi-
cult to maintain adequate personnel and facilities. It is obvious from the
foregoing survey that the judge has a difficult task in deciding where to send
the child, and that a well informed attorney could be of great assistance.
Interviews with judges, attorneys, and probation officers 277 indicate
that although the same conditions exist today, the institutions are doing
the best they can under the circumstances. It was recommended that
the attorney not only be aware of the variations in the institutions but
make personal visitations to form his own impression, establish contact
with the staff of the institution, and become familiar with the special
facilities each offers. Personal contact with the institutional staff will en-
hance the possibility of gaining admission for the client to the private
institutions, and permit the attorney to discover, not only the type of
services offered, but also, whether they are in fact provided.
Probation as an alternative to institutionalization, is not problem free
for a number of reasons. The deprived environmental conditions in which
the child lives, coupled with the fact that peer group influence can be as
strong within the society as within an institution, operates in many in-
stances to make rehabilitation difficult. In addition, the parents may be
incapable of providing the home life required and no substitute may be
available within the community. Furthermore, the probation officer, over-
burdened with a high case load, may be unavailable to provide the direc-
tion and counseling that the child requires.
275. PA. Juv. CT. HANDBOOK, supra note 243, at 412-19.
276. Government Consulting Service, Institute of Local and State Government,
University of Pennsylvania, Survey of Pennsylvania Training Schools (1954).
277. Interview with Juvenile Authorities in Philadelphia, Nov. 1966.
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As in the decision to commit, probation does not end the responsibility
of the court. A program must be designed which will provide for the
youth's supervision and guidance within the community under the direction
of the court. Normally this program provides that the child report to the
probation officer on a regular schedule, that the probation officer visit the
child's home periodically, and that the child attend school regularly. Again
it can be seen that an experienced, well informed attorney can be a valuable
aid to the court in formulating this program. Similarly, as a broader
spectrum of possible programs within the community develops, probation
may become even more attractive to the juvenile court judge, and an
attorney who is prepared to assist in identifying, and proposing methods
of taking advantage of, these new community resources would be of
invaluable service to his client and the court.
In addition, the following list, although not exhaustive, demonstrates
approaches which have been used by the juvenile courts and which the
attorney may wish to propose as alternative rehabilitative tools.
1. Foster Home Care: It has long been felt that every child should
have a home or the best possible substitute. The difficulty in foster home
care is locating a family which is willing to accept a child who has been
adjudicated delinquent.27 8
2. Fines: Fines have been used in England, Canada and Colorado
as an alternative to probation. This approach is criticized because it may
prove to be unfair or impractical for the lower socio-economic groups.27 9
3. Restitution: Although many states allow the use of restitution as
a rehabilitative tool,2 80 Pennsylvania does not permit its juvenile court to
impose restitution.281 However, this method has been recommended by
the Pennsylvania Juvenile Court Judges' Commission28 2 as a way to in-
still responsibility in the child and is employed where the youth voluntarily
assumes the obligation.
4. Work Projects: These projects which may involve such chores as
cleaning up park areas and recreational centers have been employed by
several jurisdictions. 283
5. Community Organizations: Religious groups, Boy Scouts of
America, and similar organizations may provide individuals and facilities
which can be used in the rehabilitative process. 284
6. Employment Training Organizations: If the child has an interest
in a particular type of work, it may be possible to find schools or organiza-
278. See NeUMEYtR, supra note 234, at 357.
279. Fradkin, Dispositional Dilemmas of American Juvenile Courts, in JusTicE
FOR TiE CHILD 118, 129-30 (Rosenheim ed. 1962).
280. Id. at 128-29.
281. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 250 (1965).
282. PA. Juv. CT. HANDBOOK, supra note 243, at 26.
283. See Fradkin, supra note 279, at 129.
284. NEUMEYFR, supra note 234, at 383-87.
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tions which will be willing to assume the responsibility of supervising
the child.2 s5
IX. POST DISPOSITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A method of insuring fairness in juvenile court proceedings is the
right to appeal final orders. In Pennsylvania, if the child, parents, or next
friend28 6 believe that there has been an error of law or fact in the adjudica-
tion or disposition, they may, within twenty-one days, petition for a
rehearing, and appeal any final order to the superior court.2 8 7 Due to the
broad discretionary powers which the juvenile court judge exercises in
arriving at and imposing disposition, it is difficult to successfully appeal
a dispositional decision unless an abuse of discretion is clear. 28 8 There
also exists the right of the child, parents, or next friend to request either
modification or revocation 28 9 of the disposition on the belief that a change
of circumstances has necessitated a change in the court's order.290 If this
request is denied, an appeal can still be taken to the superior court.
The problem with the modification and revocation procedures lies in
the requirement that there be a change in circumstances. In the case of
a child who has been committed to an institution, information must be
obtained concerning his progress, and this is entirely within the domain
of the superintendent and board of managers of the institution.2 91 As a
matter of practice, state institutions and many private institutions submit
progress reports to the committing court every six months, or more fre-
quently upon request by the court, but this, unfortunately, is not always
the case.2 92 Similarly, the superintendent and board of managers of the
various institutions determine when a child is ready to be released, and,
subject to the approval of the committing judge,2 93 set the terms of such
release. When the child has been paroled, or is on probation, the probation
officer is required to report the child's conduct and progress to the court
on a periodic basis, and observations of the dispositional proceedings indi-
cate that such reports are generally requested by the judge every six months.
A change in circumstances will not depend solely on the child's prog-
ress. It must be remembered that the parent's attitude and ability to
285. This method was suggested by Judge Clifford Scott Green of the Philadelphia
County Court in an interview, Nov. 1966.
Ninety-two per cent of the judges responding to the survey conducted by the
authors felt that the attorney could play a prominent role in proposing possible
dispositions.
286. Next friend is a responsible adult who bears a relationship to the child such
as a legal guardian or relative.
287. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 257 (1965).
288. In re Weintraub, 166 Pa. Super. 342, 348-50, 71 A.2d 823, 826 (1950).
289. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 258 (1965).
290. This right is another reason for the small number of appeals taken from
the juvenile court. In re Weintraub, supra note 288.
291. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 377 (1965).
292. Interview with Juvenile Probation Offices of Delaware and Philadelphia
Counties of Pennsylvania, Nov. 1966.
293. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 377 (1965).
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provide the proper environment will also have to be known, thereby re-
quiring the institutional authorities and probation officers to determine
the attitudes of the family before the child is released or his probation
terminated. The judges interviewed 294 stated that if progress in the child's
rehabilitation or the capabilities of the parents to provide for and super-
vise the child can be demonstrated, they would be quite willing to modify
or revoke their orders, and the Juvenile Division of the Community Legal
Services Office of Philadelphia295 felt that this approach served two
beneficial ends, for it softens the impact of the disposition by presenting
the possibility of alteration of the order, and serves as an immediate in-
centive for the child and parents to exhibit the necessary progress required
for modification or revocation of the final order.
The right to have a final order of the juvenile court modified or
revoked is extremely important, and the reporting of information reflect-
ing the child's progress should not be left to the discretion of the super-
intendent or board of managers where the child has been institutionalized.
The duty to supply periodic reports should be made mandatory by the
Juvenile Court Act to insure the availability of current information on
the child's progress. Recognizing the heavy burden of the juvenile court,
it is felt that the reports should be submitted to the parents or other
persons having a legitimate interest in the child, including the child's attor-
ney, so that those parties may petition for modification or revocation, and
thereby better protect the future well being of the child.
X. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Gault makes it clear that it is no
longer satisfied with the doctrine of parens patriae as sufficient assurance
that the child will receive fair treatment in the adjudicatory hearing in
the juvenile court. However, the Court recognizes that the juvenile court
hearing is neither a criminal nor civil trial and that the application of
constitutional safeguards will not depend on its characterization as one
or the other. This recognition is evidenced by the fact that while the
Court has required strict application of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, it has employed the fundamental fairness con-
cept of the fourteenth amendment in requiring counsel and adequate
notice of the charges - both of which are applied unequivocally in criminal
trials by virtue of the sixth amendment. Furthermore, the requirement
of counsel in the adjudicatory phase of the juvenile court process will
insure that the child will be able to exercise his rights effectively and
thereby receive the fair treatment so often alluded to by the courts.
The Supreme Court's recognition of the value of the unique disposi-
tional phase of the juvenile court process is made apparent by its refusal
294. Interview with Judges of the Juvenile Courts of Philadelphia and Delaware
Counties, Nov. and Dec. 1966.
295. Interview, supra note 265.
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to introduce these same safeguards into this stage of the proceedings,
however, it is evident that the court will not hesitate to re-examine this
area if it is determined that the child is not receiving the treatment
promised. The attorney, properly educated in the complexities of the dis-
positional hearing and the tools which are employed in this phase, can
insure that the child will receive the protections afforded to adults and
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children -





SURVEY OF JUVENILE COURT JUDGES OF PENNSYLVANIA*
QUESTIONNAIRE
YES NO
1. Do you review the social investigation report
prior to the hearing? ------------------------- 68% 32%
2. Do you use the social investigation report in
adjudication ? - - 56% 44%
3. Do you use the social investigation report in
disposition? ---------------------------------------------------------- 100%
4. Is the probation officer who prepares the report
present at the hearing? ---------------------------------------- 60% 40%
5. How frequently does final disposition coincide
with the recommendations of the social investi-
gation report? ----------------------------------------------- - -- - 83%
6. Does an attorney have any function in juvenile
court proceedings? -------------------------------------------- 100%
* Eighty-nine Judges responded to the above questionnaire which was distributed and
answered prior to the Gault decision.
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